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Sack: Reflections on the Wrong Question: Special Constitutional Privile

REFLECTIONS ON THE WRONG QUESTION:
SPECIAL CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE
FOR THE INSTITUTIONAL PRESS
Robert D. Sack*
We're at it again! The last time it was "free press versus fair
trial." Someone, somewhere came up with that phrase in a topic
sentence-for a panel discussion, no doubt-and there has been
hell to pay ever since. It has occurred to all too few that perhaps
free press is not "versus" fair trial at all, that the phrase is misleading, and that the obligation of the government is to provide both a
free press and fair trials, not one at the expense of the other.' The
question itself implies a wrong answer: That rights of the press may
be routinely weighed against, and sacrificed to, if necessary, rights
of the accused, or vice versa.
The latest topic sentence is: "Should the 'institutional press'
have special constitutional privileges?"2 Again, the question suggests the wrong answer: That if the "institutional press" is not entitled to such privileges under the press clause of the first amendment, journalists are not to be accorded special treatment under
the law. Even if the "institutional press" as such is not separately
protected under the first amendment, all citizens exercising the
press function, including, but not limited to, journalists employed
by the "institutional press," warrant such protection. And even if
the language of the Constitution's freedom of the press clause does
not itself imply separate institutional guarantees, press freedom
may nonetheless be entitled to particular safeguards, under the
first amendment or otherwise.
The ultimate question is whether the press' legal protection is
adequate to enable it to perform its role properly with respect to
* Member, Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler. A.B., 1960, University of
Rochester; LL.B., 1963, Columbia Law School. Member of the New York Bar. The
author has represented the "institutional press" in various cases involving first
amendment issues. The author wishes to thank Cynthia Bolbach, Managing Editor of
the Media Law Reporter, for her research concerning state shield laws.
1. Linde, Fair Trials and Press Freedom-Two Rights Against the State, 13
WILLAETTE L.J. 211 (1977). Hans Linde is an associate justice of the Oregon Supreme Court.
2. See, e.g., CONMMUNICATMONS LAW, 1978 (PLI 1978).
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both government and other sectors of society. I strongly suspect
that posterity will judge our response not on the niceties of the
opposing constitutional or historical arguments, but on whether the
result of the debate is a vigorous press capable of performing the
job that it has to do.
THE STEWART-BURGER DEBATE

The new topic sentence has its taproot in a remarkable address
by Justice Stewart before the Yale Law School Sesquicentennial
Convocation on November 2, 1974.3 Justice Stewart began his
analysis by examining the text of the first amendment: "Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press . . . ." His thesis is that the phrase "or of the press" implies

specific protection for "the organized press"-"the daily newspapers and other established news media." 4 The "primary purpose of
the constitutional guarantee of a free press," he said, is "to create a
fourth institution outside the Government as an additional check
5
on the three official branches."
It seems to me that the Court's approach to [recent first
amendment] cases has uniformly reflected its understanding that
the Free Press guarantee is, in essence, a structural provision of
the Constitution. Most of the other provisions in the Bill of
Rights protect specific liberties or specific rights of individuals:
freedom of speech, freedom of worship, the right to counsel, the
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, to name a few.
In contrast, the Free Press Clause extends protection to an institution. The publishing business is, in short, the only organized
6
private business that is given explicit constitutional protection.
The Yale address reflects Justice Stewart's earlier observations
about the press and the first amendment. In the Pentagon Papers
Case,7 for example, concurring in the Court's refusal to sanction a
prior restraint against the New York Times and the Washington
Post, he discussed the institutional roles of the press and the government:
3. Address by Justice Stewart, Yale Law School (Nov. 2, 1974), reprinted, except for opening courtesies, in Stewart, "Or of the Press,"
(1975).
4. Id. at 631.
5. Id. at 634 (emphasis added).
6.

26 HASTINGs L.J. 631

Id. at 633 (emphasis in original).

7. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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In the absence of the governmental checks and balances
present in other areas of our national life, the only effective re-

straint upon executive policy and power in the areas of national
defense and international affairs may lie in an enlightened
citizenry-in an informed and critical public opinion which alone
can here protect the values of democratic government. For this
reason, it is perhaps here that a press that is alert, aware, and
free most vitally serves the basic purpose of the First Amendment. For without an informed and free press there cannot be
an enlightened people. 8
Chief Justice Burger enunciated a sharply divergent view on
constitutional treatment for the institutional press in First National
Bank v. Bellotti.9 There the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a
Massachusetts criminal statute that prohibited a wide variety of
corporations from, inter alia, " 'influencing or affecting the vote on
any question submitted to the voters, other than one materially affecting any of the property, business or assets of the corporation.' "10 Although-the case did not specifically involve the rights of
the press, Chief Justice Burger, in a concurring opinion, used the
occasion to attack Justice Stewart's notion that the "institutional
press," including "media conglomerates" who "have amassed vast
wealth and power and conduct many activities," is endowed by the
Constitution with special rights or privileges not applicable to all
citizens alike." He observed that "It]he Court has not yet squarely
resolved whether the Press Clause confers upon the 'institutional
press' any freedom from government restraint not enjoyed by all
others."1 2 In suggesting that the press enjoys no such special freedom, Chief Justice Burger found substantial authority for the proposition that the framers of the first amendment used freedom of
speech and freedom of the press synonymously.' 3 In addition, he
thought it unwise to classify those who are "press," and therefore
entitled to special privilege, and those who are not: 14 "The very

8. Id. at 728 (Stewart, J., concurring).
9. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
10. ia. at 768 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West Supp. 1977)).

11. Id. at 796, 798 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
12.
13.
LEGACY
U.C.L.A.
14.

Id. at 798 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
See id. at 798-801 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (discussing, inter alia, L. LEvY,
OF SUPPRESSION 174 (1960); Lange, The Speech and Press Clauses, 23
L. REv. 77, 88-99 (1975)).
Id. at 801-02 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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task of including some entities within the 'institutional press' while
excluding others, whether undertaken by legislature, court, or
administrative agency, is reminiscent of the abhorred licensing system of Tudor and Stuart England-a system the First Amendment
was intended to ban from this country."' 5 "In short," he concluded, "the First Amendment does not 'belong' to any definable
category of persons or entities: It belongs to all who exercise its
freedoms."16

The opposing positions of Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Stewart were echoed five days later in Landmark Communications,
Inc. v. Virginia.17Establishing that the newspaper petitioner was
constitutionally protected in divulging the name of a judge under
disciplinary investigation despite a criminal statute prohibiting such
disclosure, Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, stated explicitly that the ruling applies to all "third persons who are strangers to the inquiry," not the media alone. 18 It was Justice Stewart's
turn to concur,1 9 emphasizing the Constitution's free press guarantee: "Virginia has extended its law to punish a newspaper, and that
it cannot constitutionally do. If the constitutional protection of a
free press means anything, it means that government cannot take it
upon itself to decide what a newspaper may and may not pub20

lish."

The significance of this debate is not as clear as it may at first
appear. 21 If the question is limited to whether identifiable people
working for identifiable organizations-the "institutional press"have special constitutional privileges, the controversy may be of no
more than passing interest.2 2 A vigorous fourth estate can survive,
indeed flourish, without classifying individuals and entities as fish
or fowl, "press" or "nonpress."23 If what the press does receives
15. Id. at 801 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (citation omitted).
16. Id. at 802 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
17. 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
18. Id. at 837.
19. Id. at 848 (Stewart, J., concurring).
20. Id. at 849 (Stewart, J., concurring).
21. Or at least as it first appeared to the author. N.Y.L.J., Aug. 7, 1978, at 1, col. 3.
22. It should also be noted that Chief Justice Burger was carefully tentative
about his views. His concurring opinion in Bellotti began with a statement that he
was writing "to raise some questions likely to arise in this area in the future," 435
U.S. at 795 (Burger, C.J., concurring), and ended with reference to "the tentative
probings of this brief inquiry." Id. at 802 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
23. The author, while not focusing on the issue, once assumed otherwise. Sack,
Principle and -Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 29 STAN. L. REV. 411, 416-22
(1977).
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sufficient protection, who the "institutional press" is becomes unimportant.
The first amendment need not be read to grant special rights
only to those with the title of a publication or the word "publishing" in their names. What it should protect is not the institution, but the role of the press: To afford a vehicle of information
and opinion, 2 4 to inform and educate the public, to offer criticism,
to provide a forum for discussion and debate,2 5 and to act as a surrogate to obtain for readers news and information that individual
citizens could not or would not gather on their own. 2 6 A special
guarantee for freedom of the press should apply not simply to
those whom a court might label "press" but to whomever, of whatever size, by whatever means, regularly undertakes to fulfill the
press function. Any individual with a photocopier may lay claim to
protection under the free press guarantee. If the Coca Cola Company decides to publish a newspaper, its rights as press in that
connection must be assured. Conversely, if Time, Inc., despite its
label as "institutional press," decides to make, bottle, and sell soft
drinks, it could not and would not seriously assert any special free
press rights in that endeavor. Labeling either Coca Cola or Time,
Inc. a "media conglomerate" is useless, perhaps misleading, in attempting to determine its constitutional rights when exercising the
function of the press. The "institutional press" has played a singular, essential role in virtually every aspect of American life. The
law should protect that role; it need not specially safeguard the institution as such.
There is an understandable, admirable repugnance in America
to the assertion of any right to special, favorable treatment. Aversion to privilege is rooted deep within our history and our psyche.
It is us at our best. Consistent with this tradition, respected members of the press have themselves denied claim to any special status, constitutional or otherwise.2 7 Nonetheless, even if we avoid
granting privileges to particular people, particular roles require
24. See Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938).
25. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 781 (1978) (citing Mills v.
Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966)).
26. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1975).
27. See Lewis, Amending the Court, N.Y. Times, June 26, 1978, at A19, col. 5;
Lewis, The Court and the Press, N.Y. Times, June 8, 1978, at A27, col. 1; Royster,
Reflections on the Fourth Estate, Wall St. J., Dec. 13, 1978, at 24, col. 4; Silk, Is the

Press More Equal?, N.Y. Times, May 25, 1978, at D2, col. 1; Review & Outlook:
Bellotti and Beyond, Wall St. J., May 5, 1978, at 12, col. 1 (editorial).
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specific protection if they are to be properly performed for the
benefit of society at large. The ability of a doctor to withhold evidence about certain communications with a patient, and the privilege of a policeman upon occasion to ignore speeding laws and traffic lights are not guaranteed to physicians or law officers because of
their uniforms or their degrees. Neither are such privileges bestowed as an expression of public gratitude. They are afforded because, in the public judgment as expressed through law, the privileges are necessary to enable the effective performance of functions
essential to the public. 28
Similarly the press has a particular service to perform. It differs from services performed by others, and for that reason alone
requires different protection. But the press role is distinctive in another important respect: Whether or not separately enshrined in
the language of the press clause, the proper functioning of the
press, unlike that of the physician or state trooper, unquestionably
has first amendment dimensions. It is not that press rights are
more important than speech rights; freedom to speak is closer to
the freedom to think and believe that is at the core of the first
amendment. 2 9 Yet the press guarantee requires more stringent
protection because of its peculiar function: "[S]peech alone rarely
constitutes nearly so dangerous a threat to entrenched government
as do the media. Its free exercise is less likely to be the object of a
governmental appetite to control." 30
Chief Justice Burger's view in Bellotti that the first amendment "belongs to all who exercise its freedoms" 3 ' may be no more
than a salutory declaration that anyone performing a press role, not
32
just the "institutional press," may invoke the press guarantees.
But Chief Justice Burger's statement presents twin risks: He may
actually have meant that protections for freedom of the press and
28. Cf. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959) (federal government officials privileged against actions for defamation in course of duties). "The privilege [accorded

cabinet rank officers in an earlier case] is not a badge or emolument of exalted office,
but an expression of a policy designed to aid in the effective functioning of govern-

ment." Id. at 572-73.
29. I have argued that "[a] worthwhile nation truly free to speak but not to
publish may be possible in theory; ... freedom to publish without freedom to speak
borders upon the absurd." Sack, supra note 23, at 418 n.35.
30. Id.

31. 435 U.S. at 802 (Burger, C.J., concurring). See text accompanying note 16
supra.

32. This is consistent with the argument advanced here that freedom of the
press does not belong to the "institutional press," but to anyone who chooses to exercise the press function.
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freedom of speech are indistinguishable, or he may be misinterpreted as having meant that. 33 Any such reading of the first
amendment is unsupported in law and dangerous in practice.
Chief Justice Burger stated in Bellotti that the Constitution's
separate statement of press rights does not compel the conclusion
that the protection of the press is itself broader than the more general free speech guarantee. The authors of our Constitution, he observed, did not contemplate a "special" or "institutional" privilege
for the press. 34 Quoting Leonard Levy's work, Legacy of Suppression, 35 the Chief Justice noted that before freedom of the press was
written into the Constitution, commentators " 'who employed the
term "freedom of speech" with great frequency, used it synonymously with freedom of the press.' "36
There is a contrary body of opinion, however: That the institution of the press was well established and highly significant in
England and colonial America. Its adherents maintain that press
rights were guaranteed specifically to protect that institution
against known governmental abuses.
[T]he framers of the Constitution knew what the press was,
knew how crucial a role it could play in shaping government,
and knew the multitude of ways in which the journalistic function could be undermined. Knowing all this, they chose to emphasize the special significance to them of liberty of the press,
and to accord that liberty a central role in the litany of free37
doms.
Even if the precise intent of the authors of the Constitution
could be ascertained, however, it would not be determinative. Pro33. See Sipple v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co., 82 Cal. App. 3d 143, 147
Cal Rptr. 59, 62-63 (1978). In determining whether out-of-state newspapers that were
defendants in an invasion of privacy case were subject to jurisdiction of the California courts, the court, alluding to Chief Justice Burger's position in Bellotti, referred
to the absence of special rights for the press. The statement was unnecessary; the
defendants were found to be outside the jurisdiction of the court in any event. Indeed, it is arguable that jurisdictional determinations do require special rules for
the press. Compare, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567, 569-73 (5th
Cir. 1966) (special rules under first amendment for long-arm jurisdiction over newspaper), with Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175, 184 (2d Cir. 1967) (no
first amendment implications in determining long-arm jurisdiction over newspaper).
34. 435 U.S. at 798-801 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
35. L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION (1960).
36. 435 U.S. at 799 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (quoting L. LEvY, supra note 35,
at 174).

37. Brief for Respondents at 51, Herbert v. Lando, 99 S.Ct. 1635 (1979). See
also id. at 47-50.
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fessor Levy's book-relied upon by Chief Justice Burger in examining the intent of the framers-dealt not only with forerunners of
the Constitution, such as Blackstone, but also with later expansive
interpreters of the Constitution, such as Justice Brandeis. Levy
himself concluded:
[W]e do not know what the First Amendment's freedom of
speech-and-press clause meant to the men who drafted and
ratified it at the time they did so. 38
[T]he Framers had a genius for studied imprecision. They were
conscious of the need to phrase the Constitution in generalized
terms and without a lexicographical guide, for they meant to
outline an instrument that would serve future generations.
The First Amendment's injunction, that there shall be no
law abridging the freedom of speech or press, was boldly stated
if narrowly understood. The bold statement, not the narrow understanding, was written into the fundamental law.... [T]here
is no evidence to warrant the belief, nor is there valid cause or
need to believe, that the Framers possessed the ultimate wisdom and best insights on the meaning of freedom of expression.
It is enough that they gave constitutional recognition to the principle of freedom of speech and press in unqualified and undefined terms. That they were9 Blackstonians does not mean that
0
we cannot be Brandeisians.
Or as Professor Nimmer stated it in the precise context of a separate free press guarantee:
[A]s we have seen in other constitutional contexts, the original
understanding of the Founders is not necessarily controlling. It
is what they said, and not necessarily what they meant, that in
the last analysis may be determinative. This is particularly true
when constitutional language is subjected to tensions not antic40
ipated when the text was written.
This idea was expressed most pointedly by "a judge" at a 1975
gathering of judges, journalists, and lawyers when he extemporaneously lectured the press:
[L]et me point out that the Constitution of the United States is
not a self-executing document. ...
38. L. LEVY, supra note 35, at 247.
39. Id. at 308-09.

40. Nimmer, Introduction-IsFreedom of the PressA Redundancy: What Does
it Add To Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGs L.J. 639, 641 (1975).
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If you look at the literal language in the First Amendment
law abridging the freedom
of the press." That's all it says on this subject, absolutely all. It
doesn't say a word about what a state can or can't do. It doesn't
say a word about a reporter's privilege before a grand jury ...
The very fact that these protections are available is attributable
to the creative work of the judiciary over the last 190 years.
If you say it's self-evident, that this was always clear, let me
tell you that it wasn't always so clear. If you went back to the
original understanding of our ancestors, back in the early years
of the nineteenth century, you would find that their understanding of this clause and the Constitution in their judgment allowed
them to enact the Alien and Sedition law. And if those laws
were still on the books, Richard Nixon would still be president
of the United States, Spiro Agnew would still be vice-president
of the United States and all of you people would probably be in
prison. 41
*

.

.it says, "Congress shall [make] no

It is the broad statement of rights and the ability of the judiciary to
infuse it with contemporary meaning that is the measure of the
Constitution's greatness. It cannot be bound by the precise state of
mind, at a single moment in time, of those who wrote it.
SUPREME COURT TREATMENT OF
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

Although, as Chief Justice Burger suggests, the Supreme
Court has never explicitly decided whether the separately stated
press clause carries with it separate guarantees,42 the Court has ap41. THE MEDIA AND THE LAW 37 (H. Simons & J. Califano eds. 1976). It is
generally understood that the "judge" was Justice Stewart. Justice Stewart was the
only member of the Supreme Court present at the conference. Identification of Justice Stewart as the author is confirmed inferentially in The Media and the Law, supra.
In the complete quotation, the "6th Judge" says: "Something was done for you last
week, and it's not that it was done for you, or that it was done for ourselves. It happened because it's our understanding that that's what the Constitution provides and
protects." Id. at 185 (emphasis added). The editors then inserted a reference to the
Supreme Court decision in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975),
decided six days before the statement was made. The only conference attendee who
could have thus referred to the Supreme Court in the first person was Justice
Stewart. See THE MEDIA AND THE LAW, supra, at xv-xviii.
42. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 798 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring). Justice Powell's opinion for the Court in Bellotti recognizes that "[tihe
press cases emphasize the special and constitutionally recognized role of that institution in informing and educating the public, offering criticism, and providing a forum for discussion and debate," id. at 781 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted), but
refused "to adopt appellee's suggestion that communication by corporate members of
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proached first amendment questions with sensitivity to the separate, particular, identifiable role of the press, in contrast with the
more general needs of free speech. A review of recent Supreme
Court decisions discloses the Court's awareness of the essential and
unique function served by the communications media, and the concomitant need for distinct constitutional treatment to protect this
function.
In Mills v. Alabama, 4 3 the Supreme Court took a case already
characterized as a speech case by the Supreme Court of Alabama,
and treated it as a press case. The Court considered an Alabama
statute making it a crime " 'to do any electioneering or to solicit any
votes . . . in support of or in opposition to any proposition that is
being voted on on the day on which the election affecting such...
[proposition] is being held.' "44 The Supreme Court could have
adopted the approach of the Alabama Supreme Court and treated
Mills as a speech case,45 holding the law unconstitutional as an obviously excessive incursion on the right of the electorate to discuss
political matters. But the statute had in fact been employed to
punish an editor of a daily newspaper who wrote and published a
prohibited editorial. Justice Black, writing for the Court, was concerned with the role of the press:
The Constitution specifically selected the press, which includes
not only newspapers, books, and magazines, but also humble
leaflets and circulars, to play an important role in the discussion
of public affairs. Thus the press serves and was designed to serve
as a powerful antidote to any abuses of power by government officials and as a constitutionally chosen means for keeping officials
elected by the people responsible to all the people whom they
were selected to serve. Suppression of the right of the press to
praise or criticize governmental agents and to clamor and contend for or against change, which is all that this editorial did,
muzzles one of the very agencies the Framers of our Constitution thoughtfully and deliberately selected to improve our society and keep it free. 46
the institutional press is entitled to greater constitutional protection than the same

communication" by banks, id. at 782 n.18.
43. 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
44. Id. at 216 (footnote omitted) (quoting ALA. CODE § 285 (1940)).
45. The Alabama Supreme Court had referred to "free speech, which includes
free press." Id. at 216-17 (quoting State v. Mills, 278 Ala. 188, 196, 176 So. 2d 884,
890 (1965), rev'd, 384 U.S. 214 (1966)).
46. Id. at 219 (citation omitted).
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Had this been treated as a "speech" case under the same statute,
the Court would no doubt have reached. the same result in an
opinion differently phrased and reasoned. But the Court's concern
was not speech; it was the particular function of the press in a
democracy. 4 7
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 48 decided days after Mills, was a murder case and the rights of the press were not squarely in issue. The
Court reinstated the district court's grant of a habeas corpus petition to Dr. Samuel Sheppard because of the failure of the state
trial judge to "fulfill his duty to protect Sheppard from the inherently prejudicial publicity which saturated the community and to
control disruptive influences in the courtroom." 49 Although the
rights of the communications media were not litigated, excesses of
the press undoubtedly led to the granting of the petition. Yet even
in the context of media abuses, the Court was careful to set forth
with particularity the role of the press and to express concern for
proper protection of that role:
A responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field. Its function in this regard is documented by an impressive record of service over several centuries. The press does
not simply publish information about trials but guards against
the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors
and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.
This Court has, therefore, been unwilling to place any direct limitations on the freedom traditionally exercised by the news media for "[w]hat transpires in the courtroom is public property."
The "unqualified prohibitions laid down by the framers were in47. Earlier cases also suggest separate constitutional treatment for the press. In
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), a prior restraint was held unconstitutional in
light of the history of reaction against Crown censorship of the press. The presumptive invalidity of prior restraints has, however, been held applicable to the "noninstitutional" press, see Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415
(1971) (pamphlets), and to "speech," see Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad,
420 U.S. 546 (1975) (musical Hair).
In Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947) (criminal contempt conviction arising
out of editorial critical of judge in civil case held unconstitutional), all four opinions,
two on each side, referred to the role of the institutional press. But constitutional law
relating to contempt proceedings respecting criticism of judges has its roots in a case
dealing at least partially with speech, Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941), and
is fully applicable to speech. See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
48. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
49. Id. at 363.
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scope that
tended to give to liberty of the press ... the 5broadest
0
could be countenanced in an orderly society."
Justice Clark, for the Court, wrote not about freedom of
speech or freedom of expression or generalized notions of the freedom to disseminate information. He focused instead upon freedom
of the press. Indeed, rather than reading freedoms of speech and
of the press as one, he implied that tension exists between the two:
In conducting a criminal trial, the constitutional role of the press
must be protected, even at the expense of free speech. Thus, newspapers and broadcasters are free to publish what they see and hear
but "the judge should have . . . sought to alleviate [the publicity]
problem by imposing control over the statements made to the
news media by counsel, witnesses, and especially the Coroner and
police officers." 51 In other words, no restraint upon the press will
be tolerated, even if speech must be restrained instead.
In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn52 the Court held that a
television station's publication of information obtained from judicial
records open to public inspection, specifically the name of a rape
victim, is constitutionally protected. It did so in the explicit context
of the role of the press.
[I]n a society in which each individual has but limited time and
resources with which to observe at first hand the operations of
his government, he relies necessarily upon the press to bring to
him in convenient form the facts of those operations. Great responsibility is accordingly placed upon the news media to report
fully and accurately the proceedings of government, and official
records and documents open to the public are the basic data of
governmental operations. Without the information provided by
the press most of us and many of our representatives would be
unable to vote intelligently or to register opinions on the administration of government generally. With respect to judicial proceedings in particular, the function of the press serves to guarantee the fairness of trials and to bring to bear the beneficial
effects of public scrutiny upon the administration of justice. 5
50. Id. at 350 (quoting Craig v. Harney 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947)); see Bridges v.
California, 314 U.S. 252, 265 (1941). See also Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
"The free press has been a mighty catalyst in awakening public interest in governmental affairs, exposing corruption among public officers and employees and generally informing the citizenry of public events and occurrences, including court proceedings." Id. at 539.
51. 384 U.S. at 360.
52. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
53. Id. at 491-92 (citation omitted).
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The Court continued:
At the very least, the First and Fourteenth Amendments will
not allow exposing the press to liability for truthfully publishing
information released to the public in official court records ...
Once true information is disclosed in public court documents
open to public inspection, the press cannot be sanctioned for
publishing it. In this instance as in others reliance must rest
upon the judgment of those who decide what to publish or
broadcast.54
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart5 5 dealt with a "gag" order imposed upon the media. The injunction, granted by the trial
court in an attempt to assure the fair trial guaranteed to the defendant by the sixth amendment, prohibited the press from publishing information it possessed about the case. The Supreme
Court held the order unconstitutional, asserting that only under the
most unusual, compelling circumstances, if at all, would such a
prior restraint be permissible.5 6 Chief Justice Burger, speaking for
the Court, avoided reliance on the press clause as the source of
special media protection, and treated the freedoms of speech and
press coextensively. He referred to the case as "a confrontation between prior restraint imposed to protect one vital constitutional
guarantee and the explicit command of another that the freedom to
57
speak and publish shall not be abridged."
Yet, potential distinctions between freedom of speech and
freedom of the press underlie the opinion. The Chief Justice assumed that in the particular context of the case, prior restraint on
speech was not merely impermissible, it was impossible:
[W]e note that the events disclosed by the record took place in a
community of 850 people. It is reasonable to assume that, without any news accounts being printed or broadcast, rumors would
travel swiftly by word of mouth. One can only speculate on the
accuracy of such reports, given the generative propensities of rumors; they could well be more damaging than reasonably accurate news accounts. But plainly a whole community cannot be
54. Id. at 496 (citation omitted).
55. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
56. A reading of the concurring opinions of Justices Brennan, White, and Stevens suggests that, in the view of the majority of Justices, "gag" orders against the
press to preserve fair trials will not under any foreseeable circumstances be countenanced. See id. at 572 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 570 (White, J.,
concurring); id. at 617 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
57. Id. at 570 (emphasis added).
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restrained from discussing a subject intimately affecting life
within it.58

Thus, "plainly," a broad prior restraint on speech to protect the
rights of the accused was beyond consideration. The question before the Court was not freedom of speech; it was freedom of the
press:
The problems presented by this case are almost as old as
the Republic. Neither in the Constitution nor in contemporaneous writings do we find that the conflict between these two important rights was anticipated, yet it is inconceivable that the authors of the Constitution were unaware of the potential conflicts
between the right to an unbiased jury and the guarantee of freedom of the press. 59
In Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human
Relations60 the Court upheld the constitutionality of a city ordinance forbidding newspapers from running help-wanted ads under
gender captions. Its holding was carefully limited to the facts before it, however, permitting restrictions only on purely commercial
advertising that does "no more than propose a commercial transaction" 61 where the restrictions are "incidental to a valid limitation
on economic activity" and the "commercial activity [being advertised] is illegal." 62 The case is difficult to imagine outside the
framework of the press, its role, and its needs; the Court ruled
cautiously and deliberately in an attempt to avoid undue incursion
upon the editorial process. Quoting Justice Black in New York
Times Co. v. United States, 63 Justice Powell said for the Court:
" 'In the First Amendment the Founding Fathers gave the free
press the protection it must have to fulfill its essential role in our
democracy.' "64 In addition, quoting Grosjean v. American Press
Co., 65 he said:
"[S]ince informed public opinion is the most potent of all restraints upon misgovernment, the suppression or abridgement of
the publicity afforded by a free press cannot be regarded other58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
713, 717
65.

Id. at 567.
Id. at 547.
413 U.S. 376 (1973).
Id. at 385.
Id. at 389.
403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., concurring).
413 U.S. at 381-82 (quoting New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.
(1971) (Black, J., concurring)).
297 U.S. 233 (1936).
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wise than with grave concern. . . A free press stands as one of
the great interpreters between the government and the people.
66
To allow it to be fettered is to fetter ourselves."
The four dissenting opinions in Pittsburgh Press67 were specifically based on perceived danger to the role of the press, not on
general principles of free speech. Chief Justice Burger, referring to
the defendant's "protected journalistic discretion," 68 called the
holding
a serious encroachment on the freedom of press guaranteed by
the First Amendment. It also launches the courts on what I perceive to be a treacherous path of defining what layout and
organizational decisions of newspapers are "sufficiently associated" with the "commercial" parts of the papers as to be constitutionally unprotected and therefore subject to government
regulation. 69
He concluded:
In any event, I believe the First Amendment freedom of press
includes the right of a newspaper to arrange the content of its
paper, whether it be news items, editorials, or advertising, as it
sees fit. In the final analysis the readers are the ultimate "controllers" no matter what excesses are indulged in by even a flamboyant or venal press; that it often takes a long time for these in70
fluences to bear fruit is inherent in our system.
In Bigelow v. Virginia,71 the Court overturned on first amendment grounds the conviction of a newspaper editor for publishing
an advertisement for an abortion referral agency. This was the first
of a series of cases 72 in which the Court addressed, and to some

66. 413 U.S. at 382 (quoting Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250
(1936)).
67. Id. at 393 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 397 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id.
at 400 (Stewart, J., dissenting); id. at 404 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 394 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 393 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).

70. Id. at 394-95 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). Justice Stewart
said: "[The] question, to put it simply, is whether any government agency-local,
state, or federal---can tell a newspaper in advance what it can print and what it cannot. Under the First and Fourteenth Amendments I think no government agency in
this Nation has any such power." Id. at 400 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (footnote

omitted).
71. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
72. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Carey v. Population Servs.
Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85
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extent withdrew from, the so-called "commercial speech doctrine":
That "speech" doing no more than proposing a commercial transaction is unprotected by the first amendment. 73 Justice Blackmun,
for the majority, noting that an editor, not an advertiser, had been
subjected to the penalty, said rather cryptically: "The strength of
the appellant's interest was augmented by the fact that the statute
was applied against him as publisher and editor of a newspaper,
not against the advertiser or a referral agency or a practitioner. The
prosecution thus incurred more serious First Amendment overtones." 7 4 Why were the overtones "more serious"? Was Justice
Blackmun implying a distinction between speech (the advertiser)
and press (the newspaper)? Perhaps, but not clearly so.
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo"5 is an important
freedom of expression case specifically directed to press concerns
rather than more general speech considerations. The Court held
unconstitutional a statute that required a newspaper to grant political candidates equal space to respond to editorial criticism. Writing
for the Court, Chief Justice Burger quoted his own statement in
CBS v. Democratic National Committee:76 "The power of a privately owned newspaper to advance its own political, social, and
economic views is bounded by only two factors: first, the acceptance of a sufficient number of readers-and hence advertisers-to
assure financial success; and, second, the journalistic integrity of its
editors and publishers." 7 7 He continued:

(1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748 (1976).
73. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations,

413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
74. 421 U.S. at 828; see also First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 798 n.3
(1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
75. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
76. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
77. 418 U.S. at 255 (quoting CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117
(1973)). In CBS, Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the Court, continued:
For better or worse, editing is what editors are for; and editing is selection
and choice of material. That editors-newspaper or broadcast-can and do
abuse this power is beyond doubt, but that is no reason to deny the discretion Congress provided. Calculated risks of abuse are taken in order to preserve higher values. The presence of these risks is nothing new; the authors
of the Bill of Rights accepted the reality that these risks were evils for which
there was no acceptable remedy other than a spirit of moderation and a
sense of responsibility-and civility-on the part of those who exercise the
guaranteed freedoms of expression.
412 U.S. at 124-25.
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[T]he Court has expressed sensitivity as to whether a restriction
or requirement constituted the compulsion exerted by government on a newspaper to print that which it would not otherwise
print. The clear implication has been that any such a compulsion to publish that which " 'reason' tells them should not be
published" is unconstitutional. A responsible press is an undoubtedly desirable goal, but press responsibility is not mandated by the Constitution and like many other virtues it cannot
78
be legislated.
He concluded:
A newspaper is more than a passive receptacle or conduit for
news, comment, and advertising. The choice of material to go
into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on
the size and content of the paper, and treatment of public issues
and public officials-whether fair or unfair--constitute the exercise of editorial control and judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial process can
be exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a
79
free press as they have evolved to this time.
At least in one aspect, Tornillo presents an apparent confrontation
between asserted free speech rights (to gain access to newspapers
for reply) and press rights (to refuse publication of the reply). To
the extent of the Court's denial of access, the rights of the press
are arguably vindicated at the expense of freedom of speech.8 0
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.81 may or may not be a press case.
Justice Powell, for the Court, framed the "principal issue" as

"whether a newspaper or broadcaster that publishes defamatory
falsehoods about an individual who is neither a public official nor a
public figure may claim a constitutional privilege against liability
for the injury inflicted by those statements." 8 2 The Court held that
"so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States
may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a
publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a pri78. 418 U.S. at 256.
79. Id. at 258 (footnote omitted).
80. See Nimmer, supra note 40, at 645. Professor Nimmer said that, even more
clearly in CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973), a broadcast access
case, the Court explicitly balanced speech and press rights, concluding in favor of
the latter. Nimmer, supra note 40, at 645-47.
81. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
82. Id. at 332.
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vate individual." 8 3 The opinion is sprinkled with references to "the
media." Does the fault liability standard of Gertz therefore protect
only the press? Chief Justice Burger, dissenting, assumed that it
does. 8 4 It is unclear whether Justices Douglas or Brennan, dissenting, construed the opinion to apply to media defendants
alone;8 5 Justice White, also dissenting, apparently assumed that the
majority's rule applied to all defamation.8 6 Lower courts construing
the opinion are divided.8 7 If, indeed, the Court meant what it said
and the rule of Gertz is applicable only to "the media," the result
is difficult to justify without reference to separate constitutional
guarantees for speech and for the press.
Branzburg v. Hayes8 is a press case, not a speech case. The
Court, "by vote of four and a half to four and a half,"8' 9 decided
that a journalist does not have an absolute constitutional privilege
to refuse to disclose his or her confidential news sources to a grand
jury. The protection requested was specifically for the journalist.
Although the privilege sought was not recognized, the mere consideration of the case assumes that the press may, under appropriate circumstances, warrant special treatment. It is unimaginable
that absent the press-function or some other special societal role a
person would seriously claim a right of silence before a grand jury
to protect newsgathering and the free flow of information"0 "because if forced to respond to subpoenas and identify their sources
or disclose other confidences, their informants will refuse or be reluctant to furnish newsworthy information in the future." 9 1 If special rights for the press could never be inferred, that consideration
alone could have disposed of the case.92
83. Id. at 347 (footnote omitted).
84. Id. at 354-55 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 355 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 361 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
86. Although in his dissent Justice White gave substantial attention to the media, see id. at 390 (White, J., dissenting), he spoke of the impact of the Court's decision on actions for slander, id. at 375 (White, J., dissenting), and referred to it as
"protecting the press and others from liability for circulating false information," id.
at 392 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
87. See cases cited in McCrory, Libel, in COMMUNICATIONS LAw, 1978, at 17,
53-57 (PLI 1978).
88. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
89. Stewart, supra note 3, at 635. The "half vote" goes to Justice Powell, concurring, who suggested protection for press confidential sources under appropriate
circumstances. 408 U.S. at 709-10 (Powell, J., concurring).
90. 408 U.S. at 679-81.
91. Id. at 682.
92. In Herbert v. Lando, 99 S. Ct. 1635 (1979), the Supreme Court refused to
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Justice White, writing for the Court, addressed the "newsman's privilege" vis-a-vis the institutional press. 93 Like Chief Justice Burger, 94 he was unwilling to involve the Court in the process
of establishing distinctions between who is and who is not "press."
He said, quoting Lovell v. City of Griffin:9 5 "Freedom of the press
is a 'fundamental personal right' which 'is not confined to newspapers and periodicals. It necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets. . . .The press in its historic connotation comprehends every
sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion.' "96 Justice White observed, moreover, that "lecturers, political pollsters, novelists, academic researchers, and dramatists" also
perform "[t]he informative function asserted by representatives of
the organized press" and might assert the same testimonial privilege. 9 7 But he did not conclude that distinctions between freedom
of speech and of the press were therefore impossible or inappropriate. On the contrary, he recognized that "news gathering is not
without its First Amendment protections,"98 for "without some
protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be
eviscerated." 9 9 The promise inherent in this statement has thus far
accord an absolute privilege to the editorial process of a media defendant in a libel
case and thus prohibit pretrial discovery into the thoughts, opinions, and conclusions of an author and his or her conversations with editorial colleagues. Again, however, were there no separate protection for the press the case could easily have been
disposed of on that ground alone.
93. 408 U.S. at 703-06.
94. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 801-02 (1978) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring).
95. 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
96. 408 U.S. at 704 (quoting Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450, 452
(1938)).
97. Id. at 705.
98. Id. at 707.
99. Id. at 681 (emphasis added). See also Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 833
(1974). Professor Nimmer applied an interesting test to this language: "Can it be
said, in the same sense, that without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of speech could be eviscerated?" Nimmer, supra note 40, at 643. The same test
can be applied to other language of the Court explicitly treating freedom of the press
with similar results.
The Pell case, which deals with media access to prisons, has been cited for the
proposition that press protection is no greater than protection for speech, because the
Court concluded that "[t]he Constitution does not ...require government to accord
the press special access to information not shared by members of the public generally." 417 U.S. at 834 (footnote omitted). Such special rights find "no support in the
words of the Constitution or in any decision of this Court." Id. at 834-35. See also
First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 798 n.3 (Burger, C.J., concurring); Sipple v.
Des Moines Register & Tribune Co., 82 Cal. App. 3d 143, 147 Cal. Rptr. 59 (1978);
Nimmer, supra note 40, at 642. But the specific factual context of the Pell case, the
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been an empty one, but it nonetheless acknowledges first amendment protection for "newsgathering." "Newsgathering," obviously, belongs specifically to freedom of the press and not to freedom
of speech.
Despite these cases documenting the Supreme Court's special
treatment of the press, it remains possible to conclude that the
particular language of the Constitution separately stating guarantees for the press and for speech does not necessarily imply separate sets of rights and privileges. It is impossible to conclude, however, that speech and the press are the same, and the protections
required identical. The Court has consistently recognized that,
irrespective of the wording of the first amendment, its objectives
cannot be fulfilled unless the peculiar function of the press is taken
into account.
PERSPECTIVE ON CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

Whether the press is free is, ultimately, a question of fact, not
a fine point. If the press' function is properly protected without
separating the guarantees of the free press clause from those of the
free speech clause, it would be a mistake to complain. But if present protection is inadequate, there is little hope that protection
will improve through newfound agreement that the press function
is not specifically guarded under the Constitution. The serious
ramifications of a conclusion that there are no special press guarantees, functional or institutional, can be illustrated through an examination of problems peculiar to the press in protecting the identity
of confidential sources.
There is irony in the popular view of the power of the press.' 00
If the press were so powerful, it would have persuaded the American public of its own virtue long ago. It has failed. '0 ' This failure is
evident in the apparent inability of journalists to explain to their
readers, listeners and viewers the implications of a press unable to
protect the confidentiality of its sources. Perhaps this inability is
fact that Justice Stewart penned these words, and his view that, despite special privilege for the press, "[t]he Constitution itself is [not] a Freedom of Information Act,"
Stewart, supra note 3, at 636, make it clear that the statement was directed to pressaccess situations only. Obviously, the words of Justice Stewart cannot be made to say
"no special privilege for the press" when he has repeatedly avowed the opposite.
See text accompanying notes 3-8 & 19-20 supra.
100. See generally Kampelman, The Power of the Press:A Problem for Our Democracy, 6 POL'Y REv. 7 (1978), and sources cited therein.
101. See, e.g., Royster, supra note 27; Oakes, Dwindling Faith in the Press,
N.Y. Times, May 24, 1978, at A23, col. 2.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol7/iss3/4

20

19791

SPECIAL
PRIVILEGE
INSTITUTIONAL
Sack:
Reflections
on FOR
the Wrong
Question: PRESS
Special Constitutional Privile

inherent in the subject matter: It may be impossible, because of
the very confidentiality involved, to describe persuasively the extent to which confidential sources play a part in the daily accomplishment of sound journalism. "Deep Throat" has been worked
over too often. He or she was not an exceptional case, but a common example of the method by which journalists regularly obtain
significant information for dissemination to the public. 102
It is rare for public servants to say what they mean about their
superiors and the shortcomings of their bureaucracy on the record
and for attribution; it is the rule, not the exception, for the dissenting public servant to communicate with his or her employer
-you and me-through the medium of a newspaper or television
broadcast as a "well-informed source." Perhaps that is not the way
it should be in an ideal government; apparently, it is the way it is
in ours.
When employees of billion dollar corporations have something
unpopular to say about the empire which employs them, their
choices, as they often see them, are: To be silent, to say it as "a
source familiar with" the corporation, or to say it openly and become unemployed.' 0 3 That is not the way it should be in an ideal
corporate America; it is the way it is in this one.
When someone on the fringe of the law wants, for whatever
reason, to talk about crime, he or she does so only after adopting a
new alias: "Source." The fear of cement overshoes persists. 10 4 In
an ideal world, no doubt, there would be no crime; in this world,
102. A good description of the media's reliance on confidential sources is contained in THE MEDIA AND THE LAW, supra note 41, at 10-18.
103. See Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 428 F. Supp. 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).

Investigative reporting is not limited to the impeachment of presidents or
the exposure of licentious congressmen. The public interest is served
equally when reporters find a "Deep Throat" in the executive suite, and
when an accounting professor [a defendant in the libel suit] spotlights for
the financial press, in common language, business dealings he regards as improper, improvident or unfair to investors.
.
[N]othing prevents [the defendants] from obtaining... information
• . . by . . . clandestine but legitimate journalistic means, e.g., leaks from

[plaintiff's] employee, a garbage can check, a confidential informant,
surveillance, a careful search of public records, or even by guesswork.
Id. at 205.
104. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Time, Inc., 71 Misc. 2d 769, 337 N.Y.S.2d 125 (Sup.
Ct. 1972) (summary judgment granted in libel case to publisher of article about crime
despite refusal to reveal confidential sources). "[D]efendant Smith has not revealed
his sources for valid reasons. A disclosure of names would involve a material threat
of mob reprisals against these informants." Id. at 774, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 131.
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published information originating with journalists' confidential
sources has certainly done infinitely more good in the struggle
against crime than journalists' compelled testimony identifying such
sources.
Corporations and individuals, by their choice, make automobiles, sell groceries or publish newspapers. Their needs in carrying
on these enterprises differ. General Motors needs steel and A&P
needs produce. But publishers need the ability to gather, edit, and
disseminate the news; the problem of maintaining the confidentiality of sources inheres in that process. The media must be able to
protect the identity of sources to maintain access to information;
neither General Motors nor A&P is likely to have that problem.
The need to protect sources is all but irrelevant to the right of "every citizen of the Republic"' 0 5 to express himself or herself or to
convey information to a neighbor. It is crucial to performance of
the journalistic function. I am aware of no manufacturing concern
that has suffered a 1.9 million dollar judgment merely because it
insisted on protecting a news source; an Idaho newspaper publisher recently did. 10 6 I know of no petroleum or mining company
that paid $285,000 in an effort to maintain access to news for dis10 7
If
semination to the public; the New York Times recently did.
Chief Justice Burger was implying, in Bellotti and Landmark Communications, that the media's right to shield sources is protected
by the Constitution "equally" with similar rights of other citizens it
recalls Anatole France's bitter remark: "The law, in its majestic
equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under
bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread."' 08
Faced with the source problem and the particular needs of the
press "the creative work of the judiciary"'1 9 over the past few years
has resulted in an understanding, however imperfect, of the necessity for protection. Despite the Supreme Court's failure either to
recognize specifically a separate right to freedom of the press or to
105. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 364 (1946) (Frankfurter,
ring), quoted with approval in First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
(Burger, C.J., concurring).
106. See Sierra Life Ins. Co. v. Magic Valley Newspapers, Inc., 4
REP. (BNA) 1689 (Idaho Dist. Ct. 1977, 1978).
107. See TIE, Dec. 11, 1978, at 68. Time also reported that the

J., concur802 (1978)
MEDIA L.
New York

Times paid more than $200,000 in legal fees. Id.
108. J. BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 802 (14th ed. 1968) (quoting A.
FRANCE, LE Lys ROUGE (1894)).
109. THE MEDIA AND THE LAWV, supra note 41, at 37. See text accompanying
note 41 supra.
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spell out a journalist's privilege,1 1 0 state and federal courts have
fashioned what James C. Goodale first perceived as a "developing
qualified privilege for newsmen."' 1 1 The simple, remarkable fact is
that most courts that have considered the issue, both in its criminal
and civil contexts, have held that the press does have separate and
particular rights with respect to confidential informants.1 1 2 A balancing test has evolved. Strikingly, this test has most often been
grounded in rights under the press clause of the first amendment
or its state equivalent.1 1 3 This is not to suggest that the final outcomes of the cases are correct or adequately protect the press, but
absent the possibility of treating the press-function specially, there
would be no basis for protecting that interest at all.
The nation's survival does not, of course, require a separate
reading of the Constitution's press and speech guarantees. Its political, economic and social well-being does, however, depend upon a
vibrant press which in turn depends on legal protections designed
to fulfill their needs. Such protections could conceivably arise from
sources other than Justice Stewart's reading of the press clause.
Thus, for example, a single speech/press guarantee, forcefully,
sensitively, and creatively construed, might well provide a more
satisfactory vindication of first amendment rights for all persons
than the carving out of special press-function protection.1 1 4 The
110. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
111. Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the Developing Qualijied Privilegefor
Newsmen, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 709 (1975).

112. See, e.g., Poirier v. Carson, 537 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1976); Baker v. F & F
Investment, 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973); Cervantes
v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973); Hart
v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 4 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1616 (D. Kan. 1978); Citicorp v.
Interbank Card Ass'n, 4 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1429 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Gilbert v. Allied Chemical Corp., 411 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1976); Loadholtz v. Fields, 389 F.
Supp. 1299 (M.D. Fla. 1975); Apicella v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 78
(E.D.N.Y. 1975); Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C.
1973); Rancho La Costa, Inc. v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 4 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1564
(Cal. Super. Ct. 1978); Coira v. Depoo, 4 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1692 (Fla. Cir."Ct.
1978); Winegard v. Oxberger, 258 N.W.2d 847 (Iowa 1977); Zelenka v. State, 83 Wis.
2d 601, 266 N.W.2d 279 (1978); Amato v. Fellner, 4 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1552 (Wis.
Cir. Ct. 1978).
113. All of the cases cited in note 112 supra relied upon federal constitutional
principles. In addition, in Apicella v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 78
(E.D.N.Y. 1975); Coira v. Depoo, 4 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1692 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1978);
Winegard v. Oxberger, 258 N.W.2d 847 (Iowa 1977); Zelenka v. State, 83 Wis. 2d
601, 266 N.W.2d 279 (1978); and Amato v. Fellner, 4 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1552
(Wis. Cir. Ct. 1978), the courts relied on state constitutions or statutes as well.
114. In proposing legislation to prevent most searches of press property for evidence pursuant to warrant, and thus, in effect, to nullify Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,
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problem with press privilege is its possible exclusion of those who
are not press-"lecturers, political pollsters, novelists, academic researchers, and dramatists"11 5-but who nonetheless require, because of their particular function, protections of their own. But a
first amendment construed to confer upon each person, including
the journalist, adequate protection for whatever his or her particular role is in conveying news, information, opinion, and ideas, may
well be more a dream than a hope. It may be too much to ask the
courts to fashion appropriate and sufficient guarantees for all out of
whole cloth. If the press is not singled out for special legal treatment, the result is likely to be merely less protection for the press
rather than the desired expanded, responsive treatment under the
11 6
first amendment for "all who exercise its freedoms."
A second possible method for supplying adequate protection is
through the common law. The courts still have a role in resolving
tensions between diverging societal interests as they arise, apart
from interpretation of statutes and the Constitution. In the confidential source context, a "common law" journalist's privilege is not
an impossibility.
Dean Wigmore, the primary authority on common law testimonial privilege, was opposed to a journalist's privilege, as well as
other "so-called novel privileges.' 117 Yet a rule protecting communications with confidential sources, although different in nature
from recognized testimonial privileges, would fit Wigmore's "four
fundamental conditions" for immunity:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that
they will not be disclosed.
(2) The element of confidentiality must be essential to the
full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
436 U.S. 547 (1978), President Carter has commendably suggested inclusion of protection for freelance writers, academicians, and any other person possessing materials in connection with the dissemination of information to the public as well as the
"institutional press." See Office of Media Liaison, white House Press Office, Carter
Administration Stanford Daily Announcement (Dec. 13, 1978). The administration
bill would protect not journalists alone, but work product possessed by any "person
in connection with a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication." S. 855, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.,
125 CONG. REc. S3791 (daily ed. April 2, 1979).
115. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 705 (1972).
116. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 802 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
117. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2286 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
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(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the
community ought to be sedulouslyfostered; and
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must be greater than the benefit
thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation."18
Although such a judge-made privilege is conceivable, there is certainly no movement afoot to create it.
The third possibility is action by state legislatures or the Congress. This is the most viable alternative; legislatures have been
reasonably responsive to the needs of the press. Twenty-six states
have enacted more or less comprehensive "shield" statutes protecting, inter alia, journalists' sources.1 19 But the shoi-tcomings of
the legislative process in this area have become disturbingly clear.
First, with the exception of Congress, legislatures operate provincially; many important publications and broadcasters do not. In a
network broadcasting situation, for example, it is of little comfort to
either reporter or source that should litigation arise in New York,
Illinois or California they will be protected, but should it occur in
Massachusetts, Texas or the District of Columbia, they may be
jailed and fined.
Second, courts have given shield statutes an extraordinarily
narrow reading.' 2 0 "Statutes in derogation of the common law," ac-

118. Id. § 2285, at 527 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
119.

See ALA. CODE

§ 12-21-142

(1977); ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.150-.220 (Supp.

1972); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (West Supp. 1957-1977); ARK. STAT. ANN. §
43-917 (1977); CAL. EviD. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
10, §§ 4320-4326 (1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 51, §§ 111-119 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1978); IND. CODE § 34-3-5-1 (1976); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (Baldwin 1977);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1451-:1454 (West Supp. 1978); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 9-112 (1974); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 7 67.5a (MICH. STAT. ANN. §

28.945(1) (Callaghan 1974)); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 595.021-.025 (West Supp. 1979);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 93-601-1 to -2 (1964 & Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. §§
20-144 to -147 (1977); NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.275 (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
2A:84A-21, -21a, -29 (West 1976 & Supp. 1978-1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-12.1
(Supp. 1975); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1978-1979);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2739.04, .12 (Page
1954 & Supp. 1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2056 (West Supp. 1978-1979); OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 44.510-.540 (1977-1978); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 330 (Purdon Supp.
1978-1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-19.1-1 to -3 (Supp. 1978); TENN. CODE ANN. §
24-113 to -115 (Supp. 1978).
120. See, e.g., Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr.
427 (1975) (shield law overridden by court's inherent power of contempt), cert.
denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330 (shield law contrary to state constitution fair trial guarantee), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978).
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cording to the maxim, "are to be strictly construed."' 2 1 In other
words, where judge-made law (in this case, that journalists have no
testimonial privilege) conflicts with legislative enactments (shield
laws), judges will, if possible, interpret the statutes to enable
judge-made law (no privilege) to prevail. The shield statutes, which
have been narrowly construed, have in fact been of limited aid to
either journalist or source.
Irrespective of approach, what remains crucial is the need to
protect the few-whoever may be exercising the press function at
any given time-for the benefit of the rest of us. We are left with a
separate statement of the press guarantee in the Constitution and a
separate reading of that guarantee by the courts as the best and
most likely vehicle to that end.
CONCLUSION

We are told that the press is perceived as arrogant; some suggest that it is impolitic, unwise, and often plain wrong to claim a
privileged position in its behalf.' 2 2 There is justification for these
remarks. Too many members of the "institutional press" doubtless
convey an overblown sense of privilege, asserted with an air of infallibility and condescension that is widely resented. And the press'
advocates commonly fail to distinguish between what is helpful or
desirable-anything, in the name of the first amendment, that
would aid in obtaining or disseminating news or in any other respect protect the business or operations of the press-and what is
essential for proper exercise of the press function. Little wonder,
then, that those outside the press find it difficult to distinguish between issues, the resolution of which will seriously affect the operation of the media, and those which will not.
But it cannot follow from press arrogance, real or perceived,
that special protection for the press function is therefore not required. And it cannot follow from press unpopularity or overreaching that the role of the press has somehow lost its historic and
particular necessity in the constitutional scheme. And there cannot
be a wrong or impolitic time to argue that the press-function must
have the privileges necessary to enable the press properly to perform its constitutionally ordained role for the ultimate benefit of
all.
121.

See, e.g., Lightman v. State, 15 Md. App. 713, 294 A.2d 149, aff'd, 266 Md.

550, 295 A.2d 212 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 951 (1973).
122. See notes 27 & 101 supra. See also Ledeen, Scoop and Dagger, HAU'ER'S,
Jan. 1979, at 91.
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